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Faculty Comments 
This paper reviews the status of the telecommunications industry and evolving 
industry policy in China, focusing on the impact on foreign telecoms companies and on 
Chinese economic development. A thorough search of the available literature, and original 
interviews in China, were conducted. The paper does a good job of synthesizing the 
policy literature and highlighting key issues, but its focus is somewhat diffuse given the 
inclusion of a lot of general, non-industry-specific material on Chinese economic reforms 
and WTO membership negotiations. 
SYNOPSIS 
The telecommunications sector in China is one of the fastest growing markets in 
the world. Until recently, foreign companies have been prohibited from engaging in 
equity ownership or network operations of telecommunications services. The industry 
had existed as a virtual monopoly, with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
controlling the sector. 
The rise of Chinese President Jiang Zemin marked a shift in the Chinese 
government. During his tenure, he has expressed the need to reform China's state-owned 
enterprises, to adopt market-based principles in the economy, and to open China to the 
outside world. During this period of change, he has demonstrated concern toward 
unemployment and social unrest. 
The Chinese government is actively seeing accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and it has demonstrated its willingness to open substantial sectors 
of the Chinese economy to enter the association. The negotiations leading to and the 
discussions surrounding Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to the United States underscores the 
importance of WTO accession to the Chinese leadership. 
The WTO talks have included foreign participation telecommunications services. 
In 1997, 69 nations accounting for 94 percent of the world's telecommunications traffic 
agreed to open their markets to foreign competition. In preparing for its WTO bid, the 
Chinese government recently allowed limited foreign equity ownership and network 
operation, marking a first step toward liberalizing the industry. The Chinese still hold 
some apprehension in opening the entire sector, but they are beginning to show signs of 
embracing the benefits of competition and foreign participation. 
This thesis addresses the Chinese telecommunications liberalization in four parts. First, it 
gives an overview of the industry, including a description of recent accomplishments, 
legal framework, major ministries, and current telecommunications service providers. 
Second, it discusses the goals of the Chinese government, especially with concerns for 
domestic reform and opening to the outside world. Third, it analyzes China's bid into 
WTO, noting the benefits and risks associated with China and the United States. Fourth, 
it addresses the 
major issues concerning reform in telecommunications services, and it 
gives empirical evidence from countries that have recently undergone 
telecommunications liberalization. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY OVERVIEW 
With its 1.2 billion people and rapid economic growth, China is emerging as one of the 
most promising telecommunications markets in the world. The number of telephone 
subscribers per 100 people in China has been growing at a tremendous rate, from 4.7 in 
1995 to 10.6 in 1998.1 In 1998 alone, China enrolled 27.4 million subscribers. Internet 
usage is growing dramatically, with subscribers increasing by 1.4 million in 1998 to a 
total of 2.1 million. Data communication is also rapidly expanding, with 1.1 million total 
subscribers as of the end of 1998, a significant increase from 400,000 in 1997 and 
140,000 in 1996.2 
1997 China Posts and Telecommunications Annual Report, p. 50. 
"China's Telecommunications in 1998," CEInet Market Research. April 1, 1999. 
1997 China Posts and Telecommunications Annual Report, p. 35. 
4 China Telecom Plans 144.5 billion yuan investment in 1999," Xinhua News Agency February 12, 1999. 
Sources: 1997 China Posts and Telecommunications Annual Report and 
"China's Telecommunications in 1998," CEInet Market Research, April 1, 1999 
In 1994, the Chinese government authorized the creation of China United 
Telecommunications (Unicom) to serve as a second service provider to compete against 
MPT. The new company has struggled over its five-year existence. MPT has utilized its 
power to restrict Unicorn's activity. For example, MPT took a year to allow the 
interconnection of a Unicom fixed-line network in Tianjin into the main 
telecommunications backbone. 
During the Ninth National People's Congress in March 1998, the Chinese 
government once again restructured the telecommunications sector, this time creating the 
Ministry of Information Industry (Mil). Theoretically, the new ministry will separate 
itself from any business activity and act as impartial industry regulator. This structure 
suggests a more competitive environment. However, much of the senior leadership of 
ME comes from the former MPT, so many multinational managers remain skeptical with 
the recent changes in government. 
This chapter describes the major players in the Chinese telecommunications 
industry. It begins with a definition of the Chinese telecommunications markets, then 
describes the legal environment that limits foreign participation in these markets. Next 
the regulatory is explored, and the recent changes are explained. The chapter concludes 
with a description of current domestic service providers. 
DEFINITION OF MARKETS 
Currently, the telecommunications service sector can be divided into three major 
markets: fixed line, mobile, and value-added services. 
Fixed-Line Networks 
Fixed-line voice networks are traditional telephone services with a cable leading 
to the end terminal. China Telecom has been in charge of constructing most fixed-line 
networks throughout China. In 1992, national capacity numbered 28.9 million lines. 
This figure jumped to 128.7 million in 1997, representing a 34.8 percent compounded 
annual growth rate during that five-year period. This included the construction of a 
148,500 kilometer fiber optic network.5 
Most of the telephone penetration has occurred in the cities, with teledensity 
(telephones per 100 people) reaching 27.7 percent in 1998. Subscribers in urban areas 
grew by 38.7 percent, whereas rural subscribers increased by 19.3 percent. China has also 
stepped up its efforts to serve the interior. Over 67 percent of all Chinese villages now 
1997 China Posts and Telecommunications Annual Report, p. 40-41. 
have access to telephone service6 . MR Minister Wu Jichuan expects urban coverage to 
reach 30-40 percent by the year 2000.7 
Mobile Networks 
The demand for cellular services has experienced tremendous growth over the 
past few years. The Chinese mobile telephone network is currently the third largest in the 
world. The price of mobile handsets has fallen dramatically over the past three years. 
Per-minute charges rank among the lowest in the world at 0.4 yuan (5 U.S. cents). 
Official forecasts of mobile subscribers have been continuously revised upwards to the 
Q 
most recent official estimate of 30 million. 
Two generations of cellular networks currently exist. The first is the older analog 
technology, and the second is the newer digital standard. Analog technology is still fairly 
6 "China's Telecommunications in 1998," CEInet Market Research, April 1, 1999. 
7 "Telephone boom has a nice ring," China Daily, March 24, 1996. 
widespread, but its base is slowly contracting as consumers adopt digital mobile 
telephony. Digital technology provides more efficient bandwidth usage, allowing greater 
call capacity for a given frequency band. Digital also allows for clearer reception, long 
battery life, and greater security. 
Sources: 1997 China Posts and Telecommunications Annual Report and 
"China's Telecommunications in 1998," CEInet Market Research, April 1, 1999 
Digital technology is further subdivided between two main standards, Global 
System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA). GSM is prevalent throughout most of Europe and parts of Asia, and it has 
become the dominant digital standard in China. Currently operating in the 900 MHz 
band, both China Telecom and China Unicom have been installing vast GSM networks 
throughout the country. 
CDMA is a newer standard developed in the United States. It allows for even 
greater compression and higher call capacity for any given frequency band. China 
Telecom Great Wall championed the technology, and the company has deployed CDMA 
on a trial basis in several major cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and 
Xi'an. Three years after conducting network trials, the Chinese government finally 
approved the widespread deployment of CDMA technology. In March 1999, Chinese 
enterprises signed US$20 million with of CDMA contracts with U.S. companies Lucent 
Technologies and Motorola.9 
Value-Added Services 
Value-added services (VAS) consist of all areas excluding basic voice services. 
In Notice 32 issued in 1995, MPT defined VAS as including telephone information 
services, computer information services, electronic mailbox, electronic data switching, 
and videoconferencing. This portion of the market has been growing rapidly, especially 
with the rise of data transmission. The largest growing VAS is Internet usage. The 
number of Internet subscribers has been dramatically growing, numbering 100,000 in 
1996; 600,000 in 1997; and 2.1 million in 1998. Moreover, the Chinese government 
announced a 50 percent price reduction of Internet access fees, which will further boost 
demand for access to the Internet.10 
Paging is another popular VAS, with the number of subscribers doubling to the 
current total of 50 million from 1996 to 1998. Pager penetration is especially high in 
urban areas, with 16.2 percent in Shanghai and 35 percent in Shenzhen. Approximately 
"China opens its telecoms market to two U.S. firms with major deal signing," Xinhua News Agency 
April 2, 1999. 
"Internet hook-up cost reduction to enhance extension of access," China Daily. March 2, 1999. 
1,200 of China's 1,700 operators are controlled by China Telecom. Paging demand is 
expected to decline as demand and capacity for cellular services rise. 
Internet Protocol (IP) telephony is a recent development showing great promise. 
Using packet transmission technology of the Internet, IP telephony will allow one to call 
other locations at the price of Internet connection. This provides tremendous 
opportunities, especially in the arena of international toll calls. Telephone services 
providers may have to rethink their rate structures when consumers become able to call 
from their Internet login ports. In March 1999, ME announced that it had selected three 
operators (China Telecom, China Unicom, and Jitong) to provide six months of trial IP 
telephony services as a first step toward adopting the technology.11 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA 
China's legal system is defined by a dual structure of publicly available written 
laws and internal regulations. Laws are promulgated by national and local legislatures 
and government agencies, often with the input of several ministries. Those are available 
to the public. In contrast, Chinese authorities also enact internal regulations or numbered 
documents that are frequently not accessible to multinational companies, but they carry 
the weight of law. As a result, foreign companies have voiced the need for greater 
transparency in the Chinese business environment.12 
11 "Internet phone services go on trial," China Daily. March 7, 1999. 
12 The American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China. AmCham-China White Paper 
on American Business in China 1998-1999. Beijing: The American Chamber of Commerce in the People's 
Republic of China, 1998, p. 16. 
Chinese laws are developed differently than American laws, and they serve a 
different purpose. Chinese officials tend to avoid responsibility for unwise laws by first 
looking to the business environment and then legalizing activities that have proven 
successful. Thus, laws tend to serve as a codification of existing best practices. This 
approach necessitates allowing activities that are neither legal nor illegal to continue so 
that their impact may be evaluated. If they prove successful, they are made legal. If 
viewed as threatening or inappropriate, they are made illegal. Unlike telecommunications 
legislation in the U.S., Chinese laws fail to clearly define the rules of operating in China. 
Publicly Available Regulations 
Because there is no comprehensive telecommunications law, there still exists a 
number of public measures and announcements that impact the industry. Prior to 1993, 
the Chinese telecommunications sector was an undisputed monopoly. In that year under 
pressure from the State Council, MPT released the Opinion of the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications on Further Strengthening Control of the Telecommunications 
Services Market. This opinion allowed domestic entities not controlled by MPT, 
including China Unicom, to offer selected telecommunications services. The opinion 
clearly prohibited foreign involvement. This prohibition was reiterated later that year in 
the Provisional Measures for Administration of the Examination and Approval of 
Engagement in Previously Restricted Telecommunications Business. The "provisional 
measures" established a licensing system for Chinese enterprises that engage in certain 
types of telecommunications businesses. The measure also defined several types of 
sectors which were expressly prohibited, including foreign participation in all 
telecommunications services. 
In 1994, MPT recognized the need foreign capital investments and issued the 
Notice of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications on the Trial Use of Joint 
Investment to Further Speed Up the Development of Telecommunications. The notice 
suggested that MPT telecommunications enterprises should use foreign funds for "joint 
investments.. .in conformance with national policies and laws." The foreign partner's 
returns must be a fixed amount over a limited period of time or a percentage of operating 
profits distributed proportionally to the percentage of each partu's investment in the 
project. However, the notice expressly forbids direct foreign investment and involvement 
in the operation of telecommunications services. 
To circumvent this law, China Unicom in 1994 had adopted a model from the 
power industry to attract foreign funds. Known as Chinese-Chinese-Foreign (CCF), the 
foreign partner and Unicom form a joint venture (JV). The JV enters into a network 
installation and service contract with a Chinese company that is licensed to operate a 
telecommunications network. The JV receives a network fee, usually a percentage of 
revenues, for funding the network. Thus, the structure resembles equity-like returns on 
investment. In August 1998, the State Council passed an internal memorandum banning 
1 Paul Kullman, "Chinese-Chinese-Foreign Investment Ban," Reports on Chinese Information Technology 
& Telecommunications. Beijing: The United States & Foreign Commercial Service, p. 79. 
14 "AT&T breaks down barriers to Chinese market," CommunicationsNOW. March 31, 1999. 
interests of 35 percent in Chinese telecommunications companies for an initial period of 
five years, signaling an end to the equity ownership ban.15 
Chinese Telecommunications Law 
The Chinese government is in the midst of drafting a comprehensive 
telecommunications law to encompass the regulatory system, administration of 
corporations, rights and obligations of corporations, and service requirements. The law 
has undergone several revisions over the last ten years, and the process has stagnated 
during the review process as it passes through the government ministries. 
Foreign companies remain anxious for the passing of the telecommunications law. 
The new law would finally codify permissible practices within the country. As 
mentioned earlier, Americans in particular would enjoy a greater degree of transparency. 
The American government has taken steps to promote the approval process, including 
then Federal Communications Chairman Reed Hundt making a visit to Beijing to address 
issues of open policy making and competition. 
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT 
Formation of the Ministry of Information Industry 
During the Ninth National People's Congress held in March 1998, the Chinese 
government restructured, reducing the number of ministerial-level organizations from 40 
15 "China to allow 35 percent foreign investment in telecoms," CBnet. April 1, 1999. 
16 Reed E. Hundt, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, "The Big River of Competition," 
speech before the Center for Information Infrastructure and Economic Development, Beijing, 
to 29. The change included the combination of MPT, the Ministry of Electronics Industry 
(MEI), and the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television (MRFT) to form the Ministry of 
Information Industry (MII). MPT was the traditional overseer of the telecommunications 
sector; MEI had strong interests in China Unicom; and MRFT had cable television lines 
running into numerous Chinese households, representing an alternate medium of 
communication. 
ME took over the regulatory functions from its former ministries. It is in the 
midst of separating itself from telecommunications service operations. The process of 
forming the ministry took several months to finalize, with the reorganization plan 
approved by the State Council in mid-July 1998 (see Appendix A for details on the MII 
organization and leadership). MII would be staffed by 320 people (185 from the former 
MPT and 135 from the former MEI), representing a 60 percent reduction in staffing from 
the combined total of 800 people from the former three ministries.17 
The constituents of the MII senior leadership have given an indication of the 
political climate throughout the ministry's short existence. The MII Minister is Wu 
Jichuan, a staunch conservative who has traditionally favored central control over the 
telecommunications sector. Prior to this position, he served as the Minister of Posts and 
Telecommunications. 
The vice-ministers consist of members from both former MPT and MEI. Initially, 
the vice-ministers consisted of two officials from the former MPT and three from the 
October 7, 1996. 
former MEI. During the summer of 1997, Wu began consolidating his power within the 
organization. In July 1997, one of the vice-ministers from MEI, Liu Jianfeng, was 
reassigned to another ministry. During that period, great concern arose among the foreign 
telecommunications service companies as they prepared for a conservative shift in 
government policy. 
As the Chinese redoubled their efforts toward accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Premier Zhu Rongji had to respond to foreign requests to open the 
telecommunications sector and to allow greater competition and foreign investment. 
Senior leadership applied greater pressure on MII to open the market. This shift in 
sentiment was reflected by the assignment of ME Vice-Minister Yang Xianzu (former 
MPT) to become President of China Unicom, the nation's second service provider. There 
were even rumors of MII Minister Wu Jichuan's resignation.18 In March 1999, China 
Telecom announced that it would be restructured into four independent divisions: 
satellite, mobile, paging and fixed line. In the near future, these entities would be allowed 
to compete against one another.19 Later in the same month, MII announced that foreign 
companies would be allowed to purchase interests up to 35 percent in Chinese 
telecommunications companies, and AT&T entered into an joint venture agreement to 
provide Internet services for the Pudong District of Shanghai.20 
"Introduction to the Ministry of Information Industry," Xinhua News Agency. February 1, 1999. 
"New rumours say Mr. Wu is to leave Mil," Economist Intelligence Unit. March 19, 1999. 
"China Company: China Telecom to split up," Economist Intelligence Unit. March 19, 1999. 
"China to allow 35 percent foreign investment in telecoms," CBnet. April 1, 1999. 
Background to the Restructuring 
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications 
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) had traditionally served as 
the supervisory authority over the telecommunications sector. The industry was viewed 
as a natural monopoly; that is, the national interest would be best served by having only 
one provider of telephone service. Given the technological limitations of the time, the 
costs of introducing a second service provider would outweigh the benefits. As a result, 
MPT exercised power as both regulator and sole service provider until the early 1990's. 
In 1994, the Ministry was spit into two bodies. The Directorate of Posts and 
Telecommunications was established as a department within MPT to regulate policy 
proposals, equipment approvals, inter-network construction, and telephone operations. 
The second body, China Telecom, represented the operational branch of the 
former ministry. However throughout the mid-1990's, the division of industry regulator 
and telephone operator only existed on paper, and China Telecom continued to receive 
preferential treatment from MPT. 
Ministry of Electronics Industry 
The Ministry of Electronics Industry (MEI) was formed out of the former Ministry 
of Machinery and Electronic Industry in 1993 to oversee the planning, coordinating, 
supervising, and servicing of the electronics industry in China. MEI was also mandated 
to speed up the development of electronic information and military electronic product 
manufacturing. 
MEI also oversaw the development of telecommunications equipment 
manufacturers, and it set national equipment standards. As MPT grew in its demand for 
equipment, its leadership felt the need to indigenously manufacture telecommunications 
equipment, and thus threaten the share of market and power base of MEI. Tensions arose 
between these competing ministries as MPT used its monopsony power to purchase from 
MPT manufacturers whenever possible. 
In countering MPT's efforts, MEI Minister Hu Quli lobbied other ministries and 
the State Council to create a second telecommunications service provider to compete 
against the MPT monopoly. He succeeded in forming a consortium of 15 organizations 
to found China Unicom in 1994. 
Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television 
Prior to the ministerial restructuring, the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television 
(MRFT) was considered a full ministry. The 1998 change resulted in shifting the 
regulatory function of MRFT into MIL The operational component had been separated 
into a lower ranking bureau-level organization, but it still directly reports to the State 
Council. 
According to the U.S. Information Technology Office, the former MRFT had 
begun to challenge China Telecom's market monopoly in 1997. It possessed an extensive 
cable network, of which approximately 10 percent was capable of two-way data 
transmission.21 These connections could be subsequently converted to deliver 
telecommunications and value added services, thus representing a potential threat to the 
existing telecommunications regime. 
Other Regulatory Bodies 
State Development and Planning Commission 
The State Development and Planning Commission (SDPC) formulates long-term 
economic policy, including five- and ten-year plans. The commission exercises direct 
control over the production and allocation of critical natural resources and goods of 
political importance. SDPC influences China's macroeconomic policy thorough the 
allocation of labor force, material supplies, and financial resources. These 
responsibilities also link it with the Ministry of Finance and the People's Bank of China, 
thus making SDPC a critical force in guiding China's economic growth. 
SDPC also approves capital construction projects and determines the size and 
distribution of investment funds. Foreign investment projects, including 
telecommunications construction projects, exceeding US$30 million are subject to 
approval by SDPC. The approval role is crucial in telecommunications where projects 
often exceed this limit. Approval can be a lengthy process, lasting from a few weeks to 
several years. 
21 United States Information Technology Office, "The Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television: The MPT's 
Nemesis," USITO China IT Issue Report. August 1997. 
State Economic and Trade Commission 
The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) focuses on production 
planning for the industrial sectors of the domestic economy. Major functions of this 
commission include overseeing the separation of regulatory and operational functions of 
all government institutions. This will include some influence on the separation of ME 
from China Telecom. 
SETC also formulates medium- and long-term plans. This necessitates contact 
with all ministries to organize, supervise, and implement annual commercial policy. 
SETC also manages national resource allocation, sets export standards, and examines 
macro-level technology policy. The commission controls national industrial production 
and maintains a production planning office, which handles problems related to state-
owned enterprises and informs senior leadership of present and future economic needs. 
There is some overlap in the division of responsibilities between SDPC and 
SETC, particularly over domestic sector and economic policy. Officially, both 
organizations formulate industrial programs and guide investment. SETC plays a key 
role in the realization of SDPC plans by ensuring adequate supplies of raw materials and 
energy. After the construction phase ends, SDPC passes production oversight to SETC. 
However, the responsibilities between the two have shifted as a result of 
government reforms and internal dynamics. Currently, SETC seems to be growing in 
power, especially as China shifts away from a planned economy toward one guided by 
market forces. It is also favored by Premier Zhu Rongji, who founded SETC as vice-
premier in 1991, and he attempted to abolish SDPC (then the State Planning 
Commission) the following year. 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Development 
The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Development (MOFTEC) is the 
principle body of the State Council that deals with business and trade activities with 
foreign entities, including telecommunications firms. Its responsibilities include the 
formulation of foreign trade laws, policies, and guidelines. The Ministry also promotes 
overseas trade, attracts foreign investment, and develops policies concerning technology 
trade with foreign countries. MOFTEC formulates bilateral and multilateral trade 
policies, and it represents the Chinese government in international economic and trade 
organizations. MOFTEC also serves as China's primary negotiating body for entry into 
the World Trade Organization. 
MOFTEC works closely with SDPC in approving large-scale foreign investment 
projects. Because Chinese government policy prohibits foreign firms from any direct 
formal contact with commission-level bodies during project proposal (although informal 
contact is not uncommon), foreign entities must rely upon a Chinese conveyor to bring 
the project proposal to MOFTEC offices in Beijing. MOFTEC then forward the project 
request to SDPC, which evaluates the proposal and makes the final approval decision for 
the project. MOFTEC serves as the primary advisory and coordinating vehicle between 
SDPC and the foreign entity. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS 
China Telecom 
In 1994, MPT was split into separate operating and regulating entities. China 
Telecom represented the operating side of MPT. However, China Telecom maintained 
close association with MPT following the 1994 division, and many conclude that the split 
only existed on paper. MPT essentially continued to function as a single body. 
As a result, China Telecom has performed remarkably well. Total 
telecommunications revenue amounted to RMB199.2 billion (US$24.0 billion) in 1998, 
up 28.5 percent from the previous year. Telephone subscribers increased by 27.4 million 
in 1998 to a total of 110.9 million.22 Total fixed line subscribers have doubled every 
three years. 
China Telecom has been building vast telecommunications infrastructure. In 
August 1997, total switching capacity exceeded 100 million lines to rank second in the 
world. It would increase to 130 million by the end of 1998.24 China Telecom has been 
installing the latest in telecommunications technology, including advanced switching 
stations, fiber optic cable trunk lines, microwave transmission towers, and satellite 
stations. 
China Telecom has experienced tremendous growth in the area of mobile 
telephony. It captured 96 percent of the cellular market, with 13.2 million by the end of 
22 "China's Telecommunications in 1998," CBTnet Market Research, April 1, 1999. 
23 1997 China Telecom Annual Report, p. 6. 
24 "China's Telecommunications in 1998," CRTnet Market Research, April 1, 1999. 
1997. Cellular subscribers have nearly doubled every year for the past five years. In 
keeping with latest technology, China Telecom has established large digital GSM 
networks throughout the country. The number of digital subscribers currently surpasses 
that using the older analog standard. As of 1997, the GSM footprint covered 283 
prefectural capitals and 1,731 county seats, including all major cities in 24 of China's 31 
26 
provinces. 
China Telecom currently utilizes the 900 MHz frequency band for GSM. The 
amount of frequency spectrum allocated for GSM is limited in handling the current call 
wolume. The rapid expansion of the cellular industry has resulted in significant service 
problems, such as all drops or network busy signals during rush periods. These problems 
may be resolved in the near future with the introduction of the GSM 900/1800 dual band 
network, which shifts frequencies during peak demand periods. This new technology is 
undergoing network trials. In addition, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji recently announced 
the approval the CDMA standard, which will allow greater call volume for a given 
77 
frequency bandwidth. 
China Telecom has also expanded its international service capabilities. By the 
end of 1997, the company had established direct dial circuits with 81 telecommunications 
companies in 70 countries and regions.28 In the area of cellular service, China Telecom 
has signed international roaming agreements with 31 carriers in 22 countries and regions. 
This allows the owner of a China Telecom GSM handset to communicate via his cellular 
telephone when traveling in one of the other signatory nations. China Telecom is also a 
partner in several international cable agreements, which allows it to serve the 
international communication demands of its customers. 
China Telecom is also involved in value-added services. It is the largest provider 
of Internet access for the country through its CHINANET division with over 80 percent 
share of the nation's 2.1 million surfers.29 China Telecom also provides advanced data 
communications services, including the construction of a financial data network in 
China Unicom 
In 1994, the State Council took inaugural steps to create competition against 
MPT. It authorized 15 bodies—led by MEI, the Ministry of Railways, and the Ministry 
of Power—to form China United Telecommunications (Unicom) as an official 
telecommunications service provider. The goals of the newly formed company were to 
capture of one percent of national teledensity, 30 percent of mobile telephone, and 10 
percent of domestic long distance by the end of the century. Within a year, the company 
began commercial digital telecommunications service by opening GSM cellular networks 
in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. 
28 1997 China Telecom Annual Report, p. 17. 
29 "China's Telecommunications in 1998," CEInet Market Research, April 1, 1999. 
China Unicorn's performance to date has been less than expected by the Chinese 
government and by its foreign partners. Competing against the incumbent player allied 
with the industry regulator created a near-impossible situation for Unicom to operate. 
MPT has used its regulating power to scrutinize Unicorn's operations, to add costs, and to 
delay network interconnection. By the end of 1997, Unicom held only four percent of the 
mobile telephone market. In addition, MPT has been extremely slow to implement 
interconnection agreements that would allow Unicom mobile customers to call parties 
serviced by MPT. In the case of Tianjin, a fully operational network representing 
RMB600 million (US$72.3 million) remained idle from July 1997 to July 1998 because 
MPT had delayed in implementing interconnection to the national backbone. 
China Unicom has experienced significant internal problems. Unicom has 15 
shareholders, none of which own more than 14 percent. In the first four years of 
Unicorn's history, many of the industry executives assigned to the telecommunications 
venture held stronger ties to their parent organizations than to Unicom. As a result, China 
Unicom lacked a common purpose among its leadership. Further adding to the 
company's difficulties, Unicom experienced three changes in leadership in 1998 alone. 
Without the level of financial support enjoyed by China Telecom, China Unicom 
has relied upon foreign parties to provide investment capital and technical assistance to 
construct its telecommunications network. Foreign companies initially welcomed the 
new entrant of a new telecommunications service provider, and many multinationals 
signed memoranda of understanding with Unicom to participate in joint ventures. 
Over the last few years, foreign firms have openly stated their displeasure in 
dealing with Unicom. Almost all complain that Unicom expects the foreign partner to 
provide all the funding for the joint projects and to assume a disproportional amount of 
the risk. In these ventures, Unicom has been unwilling to offer any operator-like control 
over the telephone networks to the multinationals. 
Moreover, the Unicom investment model, known as Chinese-Chinese-Foreign 
(CCF), was recently banned by State Council decree. Accounting for approximately 70-
80 percent of all Unicom projects, the model entailed a foreign company establishing a 
joint venture with a Chinese partner. The ioint venture entered into a network installation 
and service contract with a Chinese company that is licensed to operate a 
telecommunications network. Under the agreement, the Chinese-foreign company is not 
directly involved with the operation of the network; it can only monitor accounts, offer 
consulting, and propose technical upgrades and network services.31 Since the 
announcement of the ban, existing CCF ventures have been allowed to continue, but the 
previous model of Unicom funding has been rendered inoperable. 
Signs are emerging that indicate that China Unicom is reorganizing itself for 
commercial viability. Specifically, several former MPT officials have been taken 
positions in the Unicom leadership, including the reassignment of MII Vice Minister 
Yang Xianzu as the current president of China Unicom. Since the entity was created by 
the State Council to compete directly with China Telecom, the company's collapse would 
be politically unacceptable. Even after the ministerial restructuring which formed MII, 
China Unicom still has several strong political supporters, including Premier Zhu Rongji 
and Vice Premier Wu Bangguo. With the pending breakup of China Telecom, Unicom 
will be the only remaining provider of the full range of telecommunications services. 
Furthermore, Unicorn's financial woes have been partially mitigated with the recent 
allowance of 35 percent equity ownership of Chinese telecommunications by foreign 
partners.32 
China Telecom Great Wall 
China's newest service provider is China Telecom Great Wall (Great Wall). It is 
a 50:50 joint venture between China Telecom and the commercial arm of the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA), known as China Electronic System Engineering Company. The 
joint venture was proposed by the State Council in 1995 to utilize the 800 MHz military 
frequency band and China Telecom's expertise and backbone interconnection. The joint 
venture also draws upon the PLA's entrepreneurial expertise. Given large defense budget 
cuts during the reform era starting in 1978, the military had to find other sources of 
revenue to sustain itself, so the military went into business. A large portion of the PLA 
budget comes from a broad range of commercial activities, such as hotel operations and 
equipment manufacturing. 
32China to allow 35 percent foreign investment in telecoms," CBnet, April 1, 1999. 

unclear. Resolution of the China Telecom Great Wall shareholding structure and the 
revenue arrangements for leasing the bandwidth remain indeterminate. 
35 
Jitong 
Jitong Communications (Jitong) is a joint stock company that was sanctioned by 
the State Economic and Trade Commission in January 1994. Its shareholders consist of 
several large state-owned electronics enterprises, and it formerly fell under the 
supervision of MEL 
After Jitong was established, the State Council decided to launch Golden Bridge, 
a project to construct a national public economic information network. Jitong was 
designated to lead the project. The initial phases of the project amounted to RMB870 
million and covered 60 cities. 
Currently, Jitong has limited competition with China Telecom in Internet services. 
In fact, it is the only commercial provider licensed to compete with China Telecom in this 
market. Competition is expected to intensify as telephone service expands throughout the 
country, and it may begin sooner than expected. In March 1999, Jitong, China Telecom, 
and China Unicom were allowed to pilot Internet telephone services in 25 cities across 
the country for a six-month period.36 Despite relatively poor voice quality due to 
bandwidth constraints, Internet telephony is expected to be popular from its low cost. 
35 "Analysis on CDMA prospects in China," China Research Corporation, April 12, 1999. 
36 "Internet phone services go on trial," China Daily, March 7, 1999. 
SUMMARY 
The Chinese telecommunications sector can be divided into three distinct markets: 
fixed line, mobile, and value added services. All three markets are heavily regulated, and 
foreigners were recently allowed to take minority stakes in Chinese telecommunications 
service companies. 
In March 1998, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, the Ministry of 
Electronics Industry, and the Ministry of Radio, Film, and Television were combined into 
the Ministry of Information Industry. The new super-ministry was created to coordinate 
the administration of national information media, to serve as a neutral regulator, and to 
promote competition. 
MII will oversee several telecommunications service providers. The dominant 
provider is China Telecom. As the former telecommunications service provider, China 
Telecom currently dominates the mobile market and controls the fixed-line public 
network. A second provider, China Unicom, was created in 1994. It has focused 
primarily on the mobile market and has entered into some fixed-line networks, but its 
performance to date has been disappointing. However, recent changes in the senior 
leadership, including the installation of a former MII vice-minister as president, have 
signaled a potential turnaround in the company. 
The are two other minor players in the market. China Telecom Great Wall, a joint 
venture between China Telecom and the PLA, has completed trials of its CDMA mobile 
network. A recent mandate by the Chinese President to the military to divest itself of all 
commercial activities has left the fate of Great Wall in flux. Jitong is competing in 

37 Jiang Zemin, Report Delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 
September 12, 1997. 
38 Zhu Rongji, Joint Press Conference of the President and Premier Zhu Rongji of the People s Republic of 
China, Washington, D.C., April, 8, 1999. 
profits. In bringing reform, Jiang hopes to clearly define the roles between ownership 
rights and enterprise operation, and to restructure incentives to make the Chinese state-
owned enterprises viable competitors in the marketplace. 
The process will require process reengineering and possibly bankruptcy, resulting 
in significant unemployment as the state sector retooled itself toward efficient operation. 
Unemployment looms as a serious concern, since disgruntled laid-off workers could 
become a potent political force in the urban areas and trigger social upheaval. In fact, 
39 
unemployment reached 10 million in China in 1998. 
The Chinese government responded by promoting growth in the economy. The 
economy grew by 7.8 percent in real terms in 1998, and by 8.3 percent in the first quarter 
of 1999. The central government has poured RMB1.2 trillion (US$145 billion) into 
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infrastructure development over the next three years to stimulate the domestic economy, 
especially since the Asian financial crisis has made Chinese products less competitive in 
overseas markets. This fiscal policy has been moderately successful, resulting in a 
reduction of unemployment to 6 million in 1999. 
The Chinese government has also taken steps to move the restructure the People's 
Liberation Army (PLA). Specifically, there are three main objectives: first, to reassert 
Party control over the military, especially over its finances; second, to reduce the overall 
size of the military force; and third, to reorganize the PLA into a modern professional 
39 Zhu Rongji, Joint Press Conference of the President and Premier Zhu Rongji of the People's Republic of 
China, Washington, D.C., April, 8, 1999. 
40 Dexter Roberts, "China: What's Going Wrong?" Business Week, February 22, 1999, p. 48. 


CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 
In July 1986, China applied for entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Originally known as the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the 
organization was founded by 26 members in 1948. Membership in the association 
guarantees permanent most-favored nation (MFN) among its members. Although the 
term "most favored" suggests special treatment, it now means non-discrimination. Any 
trade-related privilege granted toward any one particular country must be shared by all 
other WTO trading partners. In fact in the United States, the term "most favored nation" 
was recently changed to "normal trade relations" (NTR). 
WTO has grown over the years, now encompassing 131 members, and China is 
the only remaining major trading nation without membership. WTO membership would 
allow China greater access to trade with the other countries. 
SINO-U.S. T R A D E STATUS 
The United States currently represents China's largest trading partner, amounting 
to US$75.3 billion in 1997. Moreover, U.S. direct investment into China has grown by 
US$12 billion during the period 1994-1997 to US$45.3 billion. Moreover, China as of 
1997 was second only to Japan in holdings of U.S. government debt instruments, and 
47 
many Chinese firms have heavily invested in American operations. 




outside WTO, and Chinese entry would serve as a vote of confidence to the world 
community that openness would be in the interest of all. 
Entry would also give the current leadership considerable political clout. 
President Jiang forwarded a bold agenda in opening to the outside world. Jiang had 
generated considerable political capital from his reciprocal visits with President Clinton, 
and he prides himself as a statesman. WTO entry would represent a culmination of the 
foreign and trade policies for the reform-minded leadership, and it would solidify 
President Jiang's position to continue with greater reforms in his country. 
Chinese Risks 
Not all factions within the Chinese government support entry into WTO, for it 
would place great strain upon China's domestic industries. President Jiang had once 
described state-owned enterprises as "the pillar of the national economy."52 Many of the 
state-owned enterprises operate inefficiently relative to international standards. Thus, 
tariff reductions on foreign products would threaten to topple the Chinese pillar, 
potentially resulting in layoffs and bankruptcy. The belief in the "iron rice bowl," 
referring to the protection and benefits provided by the Chinese socialist state, could 
quickly fracture when foreign companies enter the market in mass. 
The resulting unemployment resulting from state-owned sector reform and foreign 
competition could potentially become a destabilizing force in the Chinese economy. In 
52 Jiang Zemin, Report Delivered at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, 
September 12, 1997. 
the best case, WTO entry would be cautiously accepted by the heads of state-run 
industries and conservatives in the government who believe that China should pursue a 
more gradual course in opening to the world. 
WTO entry would place China in a position of greater dependence on the world 
economy. WTO entry would reduce tariffs, and it would allow for broader foreign 
involvement in service-oriented industries, such as finance, insurance, and 
telecommunications. Many Party conservatives refer to the impact of foreign capital 
flows and their role in the Asian financial crisis. They fear a similar fate for China if the 
country were to open too quickly. 
U.S. Benefits 
The Americans stand to greatly benefit, especially since the Chinese have 
demonstrated willingness to open its markets to foreign products and services, to lower 
tariffs in imported goods, and to eliminate quotas. U.S Trade Representative Charlene 
Barshefsky drove a hard bargain with the Chinese, resulting in the following offers by the 
Chinese: reduction of average tariffs in industrial products from 9.44 percent from 24.6 
percent, elimination of all geographic limitations on foreign insurance firms, allowance of 
banks to conduct business in local currency within two years, and 49 percent ownership 
of Chinese telecommunications service companies by foreign investors. (see Appendix B 
for further details concerning the information technology and telecommunications 
portions of the Chinese offerings).53 
The concessions of the Chinese were significant, including the distribution of 
goods and services by foreign firms, which is currently performed by Chinese firms or 
joint venture companies. They demonstrate China's desire to embrace the world, 
especially the United States. Business leaders have voiced their backing of the Chinese 
deal, especially after President Clinton's refusal to grant his support for Chinese WTO 
success, although Clinton and Premier Zhu have agreed to seek Chinese accession by the 
end of 1999.54 
On the political front, WTO entry would support the current American policy of 
"constructive engagement." Sino-U.S. relations have been on an upswing ever since 
President Jiang's visit in the October 1997. It is in the best interest of the United States to 
maintain close relations with this emerging power in Asia, and support for WTO would 
do much to building stronger ties across the Pacific. 
Chinese entry would stabilize the Sino-U.S. relationship. As stated earlier, WTO 
accession would remove the summer China bashing sessions surrounding NTR renewal. 
In time, American business would view China in much more favorable light, lower 
political risk associated with the country, and seek opportunities for direct investment as 
the market of 1.2 billion consumers opens itself to greater foreign involvement. 
53 Helene Cooper and Bob Davis, "Barshefsky Drove Hard Bargain, but Lost to Politics," The Wall Street 
Journal, April 12, 1999, p. A24. .. 
54 Bill Clinton and Zhu Rongji, Joint Statement by President Bill Clinton and Premier Zhu Rongji, 
U.S. Risks 
The United States bears some political risk in supporting China's bid for WTO 
entry. Once describing the Chinese leaders as the "butchers of Beijing," Clinton has done 
an about-face in hosting President Jiang's 1997 visit. Many in Congress still view China 
with suspicion, including China's policy toward Taiwan and recent allegations 
concerning nuclear spying. Thus, supporting the Chinese bid will require some political 
risk, but it promises substantial economic rewards. 
SUMMARY 
The Chinese have been seeking entry into WTO for the past 13 years. As the last 
remaining trading nation without membership in this organization, China views WTO 
entry as a sign of taking its place among the community of nations. Entry into WTO 
would grant permanent MFN status (now known as NTR in the U.S.), and the Chinese 
view this as a critical component of opening to the world. 
The Chinese have much to gain from by entering WTO. First, it would stabilize 
its relationship with its leading trade partner, the United States. Second, it would 
symbolize a coming of age in China, where it would seek greater overseas trade and 
foreign investment. Third, WTO would legitimize the current Chinese leadership's 
agenda of opening to the outside world, granting it authority to conduct greater reform 
activity in the future. 
April 10, 1999. 
The risks taken by the Chinese are as equally great. Chinese state-owned 
enterprises would likely suffer the most. Bloated and inefficient, these entities would 
need to quickly restructure when tariffs and quotas on imported goods are either 
dramatically reduced or elminated. Unemployment may result, potentially causing 
political unrest. Moreover, WTO entry would result in greater dependence on the world, 
which alarms older, more conservative leaders who would prefer a more gradual shift 
toward market liberalization. 
The U.S. stands to greatly benefit with Chinese accession. First, the Chinese have 
demonstrated willingness to open many of its sectors, including insurance, agriculture, 
industrial products, and telecommunications services. CMnese entry wou.d reduce the 
tariffs on products being exported to China, narrowing the price advantage enjoyed by 
indigenous firms. Second, it would strengthen Sino-U.S. ties, which may be one of the 
most important relationships as the world enters the 2 1 ' century. Finally, Chinese 
s e s s i o n would stabilize American sentiment toward China, removing the annual anti-
China campaigns that surround NTR renewal debates on Capitol Hill. 
In essence, the Chinese offered much to obtain American support for its bid into 
WTO. From the American view, there is little to lose, and so much more to gain. The 
Chinese already have relatively open access to American markets, and they have NTR 
status (although it must be annually renewed). On the upside, American businesses have 
much greater opportunities to do business in China with lower tariffs and quotas on 
American products across the board. In sum, chinese accesion into WTO wiykd be in the best interests of both nations. 
ARGUMENTS FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS LIBERALIZATION 
Although China has started down the road of telecommunications liberalization, 
the market still remains virtually a monopoly. Specifically in 1994, the State Council 
authorized China Unicom to compete against incumbent China Telecom; however, 
Unicorn's performance to date has been lackluster, serving less than five percent of the 
market.55 The division between industry regulator and service operator in MPT was 
opaque at best. 
The Chinese people have voiced strong favor for competition. A poll of 1,290 
residents in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou by the Business Climate Monitoring 
Center revealed that 72 percent of the respondents felt that the state monopoly should be 
broken, allowing greater competition; otherwise, they feel that development will be 
stifled.56 
Only recently has there been activity to split China Telecom away from the 
regulating ministry. In March 1999, the State Council announced that the state-owned 
telecommunications monopoly China Telecom would be divided into four separate 
entities with the intention of having them compete against one another in the future. 
With greater domestic competition, the next stage of liberalization would be to 
allow greater foreign involvement in telecommunications services. Numerous countries 
have followed the path toward market liberalization, including 69 nations of the World 
55China's Telecommunications in 1998," CEInet Market Research, April 1, 1999. 
56State monopoly in telecommunications opposed," Xinhua News Agency. April 6, 1999. 
Trade Organization that agreed to open basic telecommunications services, including 
local, long distance, international voice and data transmission.58 Representing 94 percent 
of the global telecommunications services market, the signatory nations have observed 
the benefits of liberalization. The Chinese have nominally agreed to open its markets 
upon accession to WTO.59 In March 1999, the Chinese allowed its first foreign 
involvement in telecommunications services by licensing AT&T to form a joint venture 
to provide value added services for the Pudong District of Shanghai and by permitting up 
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to 35 percent equity stake in Chinese telecommunications firms. 
There are numerous issues regarding greater competition and foreign involvement, 
with many of the Chinese concerns discussed below. The following arguments give 
examples describing the experience of countries introducing competition over the las, two 
decades, noting that many of the additional carriers often included some form of foreign 
involvement. 
NATURAL MONOPOLY AND NEED FOR INFRASTRUCTURE BUILD-OUT 
In resisting the introduction of competition in telecommunications services, MII 
claimed that the industry was a natural monopoly, and the introduction of competition 
would be a waste of natural resources. That is, each region would be most efficiently 


subscribers grew six-fold from 134,000 in 1990 to 986,000 in 1996. The United 
Kingdom brings another example of the introduction of competition in its mobile market 
in 1992. 
Source: ITU Telecommunications Indicators Database 
The introduction of foreign expertise would also be helpful in accelerating the 
Chinese telecommunications infrastructure in terms of development and profitability. 
The multinational firms build value from investing their expertise along with their 
money, and foreign investors are more willing to invest of they see commitment from 
foreign telecommunications operators. 
64 Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, speech at the Asia Society, Hong 
Kong, October 11, 1996. 
UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
Universal service remains a concern for the Chinese government; that is, they fear 
that foreign telecommunications firms would take advantage of the market, serving only 
the more profitable urban regions and neglecting the more undeveloped areas around the 
country, a term known as "cream-skimming." This issue was brought up by Chinese 
participants at a telecommunications law roundtable,65 and it is an often used argument to 
defend telecommunications monopolies. 
Recent evidence contradicts this belief. In fact, one can strongly argue that 
competition does not hinder universal service; it actually boosts network construction and 
service availability. Chile provides probably the best example in resolving the problem 
concerning universal service. The legislature created a rural telecommunications fund, 
financed from government revenue, to increase the number of public pay phones in rural 
and low-income urban areas. The regulatory authority in Chile, after consulting with 
local governments, annually issues a list of projects to be supported through the 
development fund. The regulator specifies the available subsidy to finance the project, 
and it issues a bid calling for technically qualified companies to assume the project. Bids 
are opened during a public meeting, and the bid that proposes the least amount of subsidy 
funds wins the bid and undertakes the project. 
65 United States Information Technology Office, "Summary of the Issues, Questions & Answers Raised 
During the USITO-Unicom Telecommunications Law Roundtable," USITO China IT Issue Report, Beijing, 
September 24-25, 1997. 
In further describing the Philippines situation, the country had relied upon its 
state monopoly for network build-out. The government initiated a major paradigm shift 
when it decided to introduce competition with the explicit objective of encouraging rapid 
infrastructure construction. It established competition in local, long distance, wireless, 
and international services. Entrepreneurs found opportunities in regions once assumed 
unprofitable. As a result, the Philippines has seen tremendous growth not only in urban 
areas, but also in less inhabited areas where technology and entrepreneurship have 
provided impetus for network construction. 
In a study of 26 countries in Latin America and Asia, those with privatized 
telecommunications grew twice as fast during the five years following privatization than 
those that did not privatize. A closer look at the data on mobile markets revealed that 
competitive cellular markets achieved a much higher network penetration than monopoly 
cellular markets, and the gap becomes more pronounced over time. Moreover, the study 
indicated that those countries with competition in the mobile market also experienced 
positive growth in fixed-line services.66 
Mexico provides an example of growing network penetration caused by 
competition. In 1988, the Mexican government began implementing policies to privatize 
Telefonicas de Mexico (Telmex) and to liberalize the telecommunications sector. The 
liberalization would occur two years later in 1990. A significant portion of the 
telecommunications monopoly would be made available to foreign buyers. In the four-
year period 1986-1990, the number of communities served by Telmex grew from 
4,781 to 6,980, representing a 9.9 percent compounded annual growth rate (CAGR). By 
1994, Telmex was serving 18,342 communities, a 31.1 percent CAGR.67 
Historical experience in the United States also provides evidence to support the 
argument that competition promotes telecommunications build-out. In the early 1890's, 
the Bell system served only the 72 most prosperous cities in the country, providing 
virtually no service to the rural areas, and teledensity growth was less than one percent 
per year. Competition was introduced between the mid-1890's and the early 1920's. By 
66Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996, pp. 37-38. 
67 "SBC Communications Telecommunications Privatization in Mexico: Economic and Labor Impacts," 
Price Waterhouse and Strategic Policy Research presentation on November 12, 1996. 
1910, teledensity growth was over 18 percent per year. By the early 1920's a higher 
percentage of farm families had telephone service than non-farm households.68 
In contrast, countries that have kept their markets closed to foreign involvement 
have generally experienced much slower network construction. In an extreme case, 
teledensity in Bangladesh in 1983 was 0.12 percent; in 1993 the network expanded to 
serve only 0.21 percent of the population. There was little incentive to expand the 
infrastructure during that decade, and wait times for telephone service still averaged 10 
years. Myanmar provides another example. Given its geographical location, it should 
serve as a natural telecommunications hub of Asia, bordering China, India, and Thailand. 
Yet in the five years ending in 1992, teledensity grew only seven percent to 0.18 lines per 
100 people.69 
NETWORK AND SERVICE QUALITY 
Experience shows that firms in liberalized markets modernize their networks than 
those in non-liberalized markets. Digitization in telecommunications infrastructure gives 
one indication of network quality, providing superior connections over its analog 
counterparts. Countries with competitive environments enjoy much higher levels of 
digital networks. In the early 1990's, digitization of the network in the Philippines was 7 
percent, and neighboring Myanmar had 18 percent. The Filipino market liberalized in 
68Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996, p. 40. 
69Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, speech at the Asia Society, Hong 
Kong, October 11, 1996. 
1993. By 1994, the Philippines' digitization level reached 64 percent, and Myanmar's 
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lagged behind at 35 percent. 
Countries with liberalized telecommunications markets tend to adopt technology 
and to introduce new services more quickly. Competition provides incentive to adopt the 
latest technology to establish an advantage over one's competitors. The end result is a 
much faster rollout of modern hardware and innovative services. For example in the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the growth of 
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Internet hosts is five times faster in competitive markets than in monopoly markets. 
Service quality is of concern to the Chinese. In a poll by the Business Climate 
Monitoring Center, 37 percent of the respondents complained about poor service and the 
arrogant staff at the state-owned telecommunications companies.72 Although quality is 
starting to improve, Chinese customers often have to wait at least a month to obtain 
telephone service. Furthermore, calls on the digital GSM mobile networks are often 
dropped, especially during peak usage periods. 
The introduction of competition has made positive impacts on service quality, 
especially in the developed countries where universal service goals have been achieved. 
Within OECD, liberalized markets have reached higher service quality standards than 
non-liberalized ones. The Federal Communications Commission quantified the 
70 Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996, pp. 40-41. 
71 Ben Petrazzini, "Competition in Telecoms—Implications for Universal Service and Employment, Public 
Policy for the Private Sector," Public Policy for the Private Sector, Note 96, The World Bank Group, 
October 1996. 
72 "State monopoly in telecommunications opposed," Xinhua News Agency, April 6, 1999. 
advantages enjoyed by OECD countries with competitive markets: 97 percent reduction 
in wait time to get telephone service, 17 percent lower call failure rate, 39 percent fewer 
faults per 100 lines, and 34 percent lead in number of phones digitized.73 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
The Chinese government has also forwarded national security concerns. It fears 
that the introduction of foreign service provision would reduce its degree of control. MII 
Minister (then MPT Minister) Wu Jichuan repeatedly stressed the importance of national 
security and China's determination to retain complete control over the public telephone 
network. In China, the telephone network is viewed as a strategic asset. Along with the 
media, it serves as a primary means to maintain contact with the people. Any disruption 
of or tampering with that service would have serious ramifications on security matters. 
Thus, the Chinese view this issue as being great enough to warrant direct oversight over 
the telecommunications infrastructure. 
The Chinese do not wish to have its communication backbone depending on the 
actions of a foreign company. In times of crisis, the foreign telecommunications firm 
could potentially find itself in a conflict of interest if the company originates from a 
hostile nation. The Chinese fear that such a company could be leveraged by the opposing 
government to obtain intelligence or to facilitate the sabotage of China's command and 
control network. 
73Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996, p. 41. 
National security has been a matter of great concern to China, especially given its 
history of relative isolation from the founding of the People's Republic of China to the 
beginning of the reform era. Concerning the dangers of having foreign service operators, 
the Chinese should examine the Israeli telecommunications model. Given the relative 
hostility of its neighbors, Israel is probably one of the most security conscious nations in 
the world. Many of the telecommunications networks, especially in the cellular market, 
are owned and operated by foreign firms. However during times of national emergency, 
the Israeli government reserves the right to assume direct control over the nation's 
telecommunications regime, even if foreign-owned. 
The Chinese should also view the advantage of having some network redundancy 
created by competition. Given its value as a strategic asset, telecommunications networks 
should be reliable, modern, and redundant. Monopoly infrastructures will be less reliable 
and technologically inferior than those built by competition, and they will have little or no 
redundancy. During a time of natural disaster, such as the floods experienced by China 
during the summer of 1998, having an extensive and somewhat redundant 
telecommunications infrastructure would be highly desirable, since it would mitigate the 
risk of losing communications with the crisis area. It would be the most likely structure 
to save lives in time of emergencies, and it should be seriously considered in any national 
security analysis. 
74Joseph Kahn, "China determined to go it alone on phone service," The Ottawa Citizen. September 2 
1997, p. C3. 
EMPLOYMENT 
Employment and social stability remain key concerns for the Chinese government, 
and all signs indicate that liberalization in the telecommunications sector would stimulate 
job growth. With the introduction of additional carriers, telecommunications firms must 
hire additional people for marketing, sales, customer service, and software design. A 
study of 26 Latin American and Asian countries revealed that markets with competition 
consistently increased employment levels by an average of 16 percent. In contrast two-
thirds of the monopoly countries witnessed a shrinking of employment by an average of 9 
. 75 
percent.. 
Competition generates significant impact in increasing market size and creating 
employment opportunities. In Australia, growth in mobile services up to 1992 remained 
moderate, growing approximately 30 percent over the period 1990-1992. After 
competition was introduced, jobs in the cellular sector tripled in the two-year period 
1992-1994.76 
Source: OECD 
In India when competition was introduced, the incumbent operator (Department of 
Telecommunications) had to improve its marketing, and it opened thousands of public 
call offices around the country. The agency expected to expand its workforce from 
700,000 to 3,000,000 by the year 2000. In the cellular markets, new mobile companies 
were hiring people at a hectic pace. The Birla-AT&T group planned to hire 5,000 
employees within the first three years of operation. Given there are over thirty licensed 
mobile operators in the country, the employment figure for mobile telecommunications 
could easily exceed 100,000.77 
The deregulation of telecommunications has also created new industries and job 
opportunities in India. The software industry in Bangalore was created out of India's 
high-skill labor pool and low-cost, reliable international communications. The industry 
had export revenue of $300 million in 1994, and it expected to employ 100,000 people as 
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of 1996. Indeed, advanced communications creates greater opportunities. 
The Mexican example illustrates the efficiency and employment gains of 
telecommunications liberalization. A Price Waterhouse/Strategic Policy Research study 
revealed significant productivity gains among Telmex employees following liberalization 
in 1990. The number of access lines served per employee almost doubled from 85 in 
1988 to 168 six years later in 1994. When examining the number of telephone minutes 
served by each employee, the study showed that the number increased by 130 percent, 
from 80 minutes in 1988 to 184 in 1994. Furthermore, the direct and indirect effects on 
job creation in the Mexican economy were substantial. The study estimated that the 
introduction of competition and Telmex privatization generated a total of 41,700-59,400 
jobs for the Mexican people. 
PRICES 
Despite a recent announcement by MII lowering the cost of international, 
domestic long distance, and telephone installation charges,80 Chinese consumers still 
complain about high telecommunications costs. Active competition would effectively 
address that issue. Among OECD countries, prices for international services with 
competitive markets are on 11 percent lower on average than the OECD mean. In the 
United States, the 1984 placed great downward pressure on long distance rates. AT&T's 
prices fell more than 70 percent in real terms between 1983, the year prior to the breakup 
of AT&T, and 1991. Similarly in Japan, competition in 1986 resulted in Nippon 
Telegraph and Telephone's long distance rates falling by 50 percent between 1985 and 
1992.81 
A similar pattern is evident among the developing countries. Chile provides a 
good example. From 1989 to 1994, the country privatized and introduced limited 
competition. In the same period, local rates dropped an average of 36 percent, long-
distance rates by 38 percent, and international rates by 46 percent. After full competition 
in international services was introduced in 1993, seven companies were offering low-rate 
international services. In 1994, international rates fell an additional 70 percent, giving 
Chile the lowest international prices in the world. The price of a call from Chile to the 
United States cost four times less than one from Brazil to the United States, and seven 
times less than one from Argentina to the United States.82 
In some cases, liberalization resulted in an increase in telecommunications rates, 
but those usually occurred in countries that had some form of cross-subsidization, e.g. 
high international long-distance rates used to help fund local services. This model was 
used in the United States during the AT&T monopoly during the pre-1984 era, and it has 
81 Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996, pp. 32-33. 
been adopted by several other nations. For example, countries charge high accounting 
rates (the amount of revenue received from international calls) to fund national 
infrastructure construction. 
Modern technology is beginning to make this model unsustainable in the future. 
Callback features present consumers with the option of originating international calls 
from the lower cost country; call routing permits calls to take advantage of differences 
among international settlement rates, even passing the call through the switchboards of 
several countries to connect the call at the lowest possible price. Internet Protocol (IP) 
telephony probably provides the newest, greatest threat, allowing users to dial anywhere 
in the world at the price of Internet connection. Initially opposing the usage of IP 
telephony because of the threat to international call revenues, China is taking initial steps 
to embrace it. In March 1999, ME licensed three Chinese companies—China Telecom, 
China Unicom, and Jitong—to conduct a six-month trial of IP telephony.83 The results of 
these trials could have major impact on future developments and rate structures in the 
industry. 
ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC BENEFITS 
The benefits of a massive telecommunications infrastructure build-out in China 
would have tremendous economic impact. For the rural areas in China, the benefits of 
connecting the first telephone line to a village would provide invaluable benefits. It 
82 Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1996, p. 33. 
would allow village leaders to quickly request assistance during times of disaster. The 
communications link could be used to give villages access to highly trained physicians 
and to receive outpatient telemedicine care. Telephone service could also be used to 
educate children. From any region in China, Internet access would open the eyes of the 
young to the rest of the world. 
Telecommunications services can also generate savings by cost cutting and 
promoting economic efficiency. In Uganda, an estimated 250 worker-years of 
government labor are annually wasted on approximately 40,000 administrative trips that 
could otherwise be served by telephone. A study in Yemen found that 10-25 percent 
could be avoided if good, reliable telecommunications were available. Given the 
current transportation situation in China—congested urban avenues and underdeveloped 
rural road systems—the value of a highly developed telecommunications infrastructure 
becomes self-evident. 
SUMMARY 
The telecommunications services industry in China is still virtually a state-run 
monopoly, although it is showing signs of changing. The Chinese people have voiced 
strong favor toward competition this sector. The government has responded with 
breaking up China Telecom and allowing limited foreign involvement in 
telecommunications services. Many Party conservatives still express apprehension toward 
83China starts to try IP phone," Xinhua News Agency, March 17, 1999. 
full liberalization; however, technology changes and recent experiences by other nations 
provide insight to answering their concerns. 
In addressing natural monopoly concerns, recent technological advances have 
allowed for direct competition. In the United States, digital microwave and switching 
technologies allowed secondary carriers to compete effectively against AT&T. 
Competition also creates provides incentive for efficient allocation of resources and 
greater opportunity for market expansion. 
Universal service remains a key concern. Many fear that foreign companies will 
serve only the most lucrative markets and neglect the underdeveloped regions of the 
country. Countries such as Chile have answered the need by creating a rural 
telecommunications fund, financed from government revenues. The fund is then used to 
subsidize lower return projects. 
Network service and quality have demonstrated signs of improvement with 
market liberalization. To establish an advantage over their competitors, companies will 
adopt the new technologies. As a result, digitization is highest among countries with 
competition. Customer service also improves with competition, since customers 
ultimately reserve the right to switch service. 
National security also presents a tough challenge. Countries desire self-reliance, 
especially with strategic assets such as telecommunications. Israel responded by 
reserving the right to assume control over all communication assets during times of crisis. 
84 Ben Petrazzini, Global Telecom Talks: A Trillion Dollar Deal. Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
Competition will create some redundancy in the telephone network. During times of 
natural disaster, the redundancy will serve to mitigate the risk of losing communication 
with the crisis area. 
Employment has remained a critical issue during China's reform of state-owned 
enterprises. The Chinese government should be comforted in knowing that introducing 
competition will not only generate new jobs, but it has also created new markets, such as 
the software development industry in Bangalor, India. One study of Asian and Latin 
American countries revealed that markets with competition in telecommunications 
significantly increase employment levels. 
In most competitive environments, prices tend to fall. This is also true in 
telecommunications services, leading to price drops as high as 50-70 percent. Exceptions 
to this rule include instances of cross-subsidization of telephone rates, e.g. using high 
international rates to help fund local service; however, this scenario will be unsustainable. 
Technological advancements—such as callback, call routing, and Internet Protocol 
telephony—will seek the lowest cost alternative and impact rate structures in the near 
future. 
The benefits to liberalization and market competition are overwhelming. The 
Chinese have realized this lesson, and they have taken the initial steps to open to the 
outside world. Recent developments in the telecommunications sector have been 
International Economics, 1996, p. 44. 
encouraging, and these will definitely benefit the Chinese people as the country heads 
into the next millennium. 
APPENDIX A: MINISTRY OF INFORMATION INDUSTRY 
Minister: Wu Jichuan, former MPT Minister 
Vice Ministers: Lu Xinkui, former MEI Vice Minister 
Qu Weizhi, former MEI Vice Minister 
Zhou Deqiang, former MPT Vice Minister 
Director-Generals and descriptions of the 13 functional departments of ME: 
General Office 
Director-General Cheng Guanghui 
Deputy Director-General Guo Hao, Zhou Baoyuan, Chi Quanguo 
Executes administrative work, including coordination, meeting planning, publicity, public 
relations, and financial affairs. 
Department of Policy and Legal Affairs 
Director-General Liu Cai 
Deputy Director-General Ji Jinkui, Zhao Meizhuang 
Researches and enacts laws, regulations, and policies pertaining to the information 
industry sector, international cooperation, and important reform programs. 
Department of Comprehensive Planning 
Director-General Wang Jianzhou 
Deputy Director-General Wang Jianzhang, Jiang Shaobing, Liu Rulin 
Researches and drafts strategic development plans for the electronic information product 
manufacturing industry, communications industry, and the software industry; coordinates 
the construction of the basic telecommunications network, computer network, radio and 
television networks, and other special communications networks so as to promote the 
development of public networks and special networks; coordinates the development of 
service and manufacturing industries; manages the allocation of resources to prevent 
redundant construction; oversees construction budgetary matters; sets guidelines for the 
import of technology, promoting foreign investment and international cooperation; 
formulates standards and norms for the design and construction of communication and 
information networks; macro-manages the communication and information network 
construction market; and gathers statistics and publicizes industry information. 
Department of Science and Technology 
Director-General Xu Shuncheng 
Deputy Director-General Wen Ku, Chen Xiaozhu 
Tracks international trends in information technology; formulates technological 
development programs and policies; composes technological standards for public 
communication networks; handles network suffix planning; drafts technological standards 
for radio and television network systems; coordinates significant research projects and 
promotes the industrial application of advances in scientific research; inspects the quality 
of electronic information products; and administers electronic information technology 
standards and measurements. 
Department of Reform and Economic Operations 
Director-General Li Zhiming 
Deputy Director-General Lin Yuanfang, Zhou Zixue 
Drafts enterprise reform plans and sets guidelines for enterprise reform, reorganization, 
transformation and management; handles significant issues relating to enterprise reform; 
formulates policies and measures to promote the development of large enterprises, and 
guides state-owned enterprises through their strategic reorganization; monitors economic 
operations; collects and analyzes statistics pertaining to economic operations; forecasts 
annual development estimates; macro-manages the electronic information products 
market; and administers the import of electronic information products. 
Telecommunications Bureau 
Director-General Zhang Chunjiang 
Deputy Director-General Chang Xiaobing, Zhou Baoxin, Wang Xiujun 
Formulates development plans, policies, and measures for the telecommunications 
industry; exercises supervision over telecommunications and information services to 
ensure fair competition and to protect the legitimate interests of consumers; approves and 
issues licenses to telecommunication and information service providers; supervises 
service pricing and quality; formulates and enforces methods of interconnection and 
revenue settlement between telecommunications networks; distributes and manages 
telecommunications network suffixes; administers Internet domain names and websites 
domestically and internationally; certifies telecommunications network equipment 
connection standards; manages network access telecommunications terminal equipment; 
organizes and coordinates the construction and management of the special 
telecommunications networks of party and government institutions; manages the State 
Telecommunication Network Monitoring and Control Center, State Telecommunication 
Entry-Exit Control Bureau, and Internet Security Control Center; directs the emergency 
telecommunication system; and researches and addresses problems regarding national 
telecommunications networks and information security. 
Department of Economic Adjustment and Communication Revenue Settlement 
Director-General Wu Andi 
Deputy Director-General Zhang Xiaotie, Xue Taohai 
Implements and enforces laws, regulations, and government policies concerning 
accounting systems and the management of national assets; formulates and enforces 
financial regulations for the telecommunications industry; formulates rules for financial 
tabulation and reporting by postal and telecommunications enterprises, and determines 
the rate of government appropriation and the rate of profit to be handed over to the state, 
as well as settlement of telecommunications enterprises; subsidizes services in 
accordance with relevant government regulations; sets telecommunications, information, 
and postal service rates; manages budgetary funds. 
Department of Electronic Information Products 
Director-General Zhang Qi 
Deputy Director-General Xie Linzhen, Zheng Minzheng, Chen Chong 
Formulates medium- and long-term development plans, policies, and measures for the 
software and electronic information products manufacturing industries; guides the 
development of product lines; organizes the development and production of fundamental 
products including large system equipment and micro-electronics, localizes the 
production of equipment, components, appliances, and materials required for major 
projects; composes industrial investment guidelines; and promotes the practical 
application of electronic information technology. 
Military Electronic Bureau (Special Electronic Equipment Bureau) 
Director Bao Yanghao 
Deputy Director Liu Xiaoying, Wang Shaoxiang 
Manages military electronic industry. 
Information Promotion Department (replaces the former State Information Office) 
Director-General Song Ling 
Deputy Director-General Zhao Xiaofan 
Formulates development plans to promote the application of information technology in 
the national economy and society; guides the application of information technology in all 
regions and industries; assists industries in their effort to promote significant information 
projects; promotes the development of the software industry; formulates policies and 
measures relating to the development of information resources; coordinates the 
development and application of information resources and information security 
technology; and promotes the application of information technology through publicity 
and education. 
Radio Reguatory Bureau (replaces the former State Radio Regulatory Commission) 
Director Liu Lihua 
Deputy Director Zhu Sanbao, Chen Ruming 
Plans and rationally allocates radio frequencies; oversees the operation of radio stations; 
handles matters relating to radio-magnetic interference to maintain radio wave order; 
exercises radio control in accordance with the law; coordinates satellite orbit positioning; 
organizes delegations to participate in international radio conferences; and manages 
foreign radio matter. 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
Director-General Zhao Xintong 
Deputy Director-General Zhan Xuan, Qu Wenchu 
Oversees China's entry into international information industry organizations; coordinates 
the signing and implementation of intergovernmental agreements concerning 
telecommunications and information issues; drafts policies on international economic and 
technological cooperation in the information industry and handles matters concerning 
international cooperation; and examines and approves proposed Chinese international 
delegations and visits. 
Personnel Department 
Director-General Liu Yangsheng 
Deputy Director-General Zhou Nairui, Lin Yihong 
Manages personnel and training, including personnel from overseas. 
APPENDIX B: CHINESE CONCESSIONS 
Excerpts from "Market Access Commitments of the Government of China on Goods, 
Services, and Agriculture," Office of the United States Trade Representative press release 
99-34, April 8, 1999. 
Broadly speaking, the market access commitments China has made will bring China at or 
above existing WTO standards on issues and sectors of major concern to the U.S. They 
address each layer of Chinese trade barriers to American exports. 
In each case, the U.S. has achieved commitments that address the principal barriers to 
American products; are highly specific and fully enforceable; are phased-in over a 
relatively short period of time, with increased market access in every area as of day one of 
China's ultimate accession; do not offer China special treatment; and meet or exceed 
commitments made by many present WTO members. The commitments include: 
• Significant market access benefits effective immediately on China's accession. 
• Full market access for U.S. firms to distribute their products throughout China. 
• Tariff reductions immediately upon accession, with further phase-ins over reasonable 
periods of time to levels below those of most U.S. trade partners. 
• Bindings for all tariffs—i.e., China will be unable to raise tariffs again after accession. 
• Elimination of quantitative restrictions. 
• Resolution of outstanding problems with sanitary and phytosanitary standards for key 
agricultural products, effective immediately. 
• Participation in the three major multilateral agreements negotiated since the Uruguay 
Round: the Information Technology Agreement; the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications; and the Financial Services Agreement. 
• Commitments to more open service sectors which cover the broad range of sectors, 
including distribution, value-added telecommunications, insurance, computer and 
business services, environmental services, franchising and direct sales, legal and 
accounting, sound recordings, and entertainment software. 
Tariff Reductions In High Technology—China will implement the Information 
Technology Agreement. This will reduce tariffs from present levels averaging 13.3% to 
zero for semiconductors, computers, computer equipment, telecommunications 
equipment and other information technology products. Most of these tariff eliminations 
will be phased in by 2003 with some exceptions until 2005. All other Information 
Technology Agreement participants will have implemented tariff cuts by 2005. 
Quotas and Other Non-Tariff Measures—WTO rules bar quotas and other quantitative 
restrictions. China has agreed to eliminate these restrictions immediately on accession for 
top U.S. priorities and with phase-ins limited to five years for others. 
China will eliminate existing quotas upon accession for the top U.S. priorities (e.g. some 
fertilizers and fiber optic cable). It will phase-out remaining quotas, generally by 2002, 
but no later than 2005. 
Telecommunications Services—China now severely restricts sales of 
telecommunications services and bars foreign investment. China's commitments mark its 
first agreement ever to open its telecommunications sector, both to the scope of services 
and to direct investment in telecommunications businesses. Through these commitments, 
China will become a member of the Basic Telecommunications Agreement. Specific 
commitments include: 
Regulatory Principles—China now allows its telecommunications bureaucracies very 
wide discretion to apply arbitrary and discriminatory standards. China will now agree to 
implement the pro-competitive regulatory principles embodied in the Basic 
Telecommunications Agreement (including cost-based pricing, interconnection rights and 
independent regulatory authority), and agreed to technology-neutral scheduling, which 
means foreign suppliers can use any technology they choose to provide 
telecommunications services. 
Scope of Services—China will phase out all geographic restrictions for: 
• paging, value added and closed user groups: 4 years 
• mobile/cellular: 5 years 
• domestic wireline services: 6 years 
China's key telecommunications services corridor in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, 
which represents approximately 75% of all domestic traffic, will open immediately on 
accession in all telecommunications services. 
Investment—Under present circumstances, China allows no foreign investment in 
telecommunications services. With this agreement, China will allow 49% foreign 
investment in all services, and will allow 51% foreign ownership for value added and 
paging services in 4 years. 
Investment and Technology Transfer—These provisions will also help protect 
American firms against forced technology transfers, as China has also agreed that, upon 
accession it will not condition investment approvals, import licenses, or any other import 
approval process on performance requirements of any kind, including: 
. local content requirements, 
• offsets, 
. transfer of technology, or 
. requirements to conduct research and development in China. 
These are significant commitments that go a long way in addressing concerns about the 
terms and conditions of investment in China, and the government's role in what should be 
commercial decisions. 
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AmCham proposals 
• Favors Chinese accession into WTO 
• Advocates legislation of Chinese telecommunications law 
• Advocates separation of government regulation from network operation 
Liberalization impact in insurance 
• Shanghai: let in foreign companies 
• Market size increased; share of Chinese companies decline from 100% to only 85% 
• Competition in services resulted in market expansion 
• Chinese view manufacturing sector as zero-sum scenario: if foreigners sell, then 
Chinese do not sell 
Securities firms 
• Less foreign speculation 
• Chinese do not understand ROI 
Premier Zhu is a central planner 
• Use markets only for discipline 
. Desire to maintain central control 
Market forces 
• Allowing competition (including U.S. firms) would regulate economic activity 
• Encourage innovation 
• Expand market 
Chinese policy factors 
• Fear of chaos 
• Fear of losing sovereignty 
• Foreigners should not be allowed to control something that should be Chinese 
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• USITO presentations from invitees: Sep/Oct 1997, Oct 1998 
• AmCham position paper 
• Chinese arguments from professors, MRFT 
• Michael Borrus from U.C. Berkeley 
China is not considering any one national model in reforming the telecommunications 
sector 
• Japan and Germany liberalizing more slowly 
CCF model 
• No more CCF 
• Current projects to be reviewed 
• Seen as step backward from liberalization 
March 5, 1999 
Michael J. Wang 
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jianhong.wang@mail.doc.gov 
Breakup of China Telecom 
• Telecommuncations licensing system being introduced 
• Press calling for lower tariffs 
• CDMA lobby 
U.S. model 
• Debate on how to open services 
• Zhou Qiren, Beijing University; Wang Xiaochang for CT; Fang Hongyi from SARFT 
• FCC model appeals to consumers, supported by SETC and the public 
Press has been criticizing telecommunications prices and service quality, started late 1998 
FCS conducted round table in October 1998 
• Universal services: cause to block China Unicom 
• Corbett presented telecommunications reference paper 
• Attended by Chinese think tanks 
• Stimulated flurry of articles 
Issues 
• Market liberalization 
• Benefits of competition 
• Universal service 
• WTO entry 
• Telecommunications reference paper 
Zhou Qiren article 
• Introduction of foreign technology and expertise benefits China's growth 
• Consumer electronics example: Hai'er now leading in market share 
• Competition improves quality, now Chinese firms kicking out foreigners 
• Liberalization brought China to world standards 
Competition between SARFT and CT 
• Cable modems can now be used for data transmission in addition to television 
• SARFT wants to provide voice service, create competition 
• State Council response: stay in your own realms 
• SARFT national backbone nearly complete, possibilities with IP telephony 
Unicom 
• Introduced to bring about competition 
• Brought GSM to China 
• Currently possesses only 2% market share 
• Leadership change, mostly from MII 
• May go public in a couple years 
Premier Zhu Rongji 
• Wants competition in the sector 
• Separation of operator from regulator 
• Resolve interconnection issues 
• Regulator should remain neutral 
MII Minister Wu Jichuan 
• Power is waning 
• Expected to step down in 2-3 years 
Models for CT breakup 
• AT&T breakup (1984) 
• All MII proposals for breakup have been rejected 
• Speculation that CT will be broken along functional lines with fixed telephony further 
divided along regional lines 
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• Telecommunications experiencing 12% growth rates compared to the economy (less 
than 8%) 
• China Telecom is doing well on its own 
• Why liberalize? 
Virtues of competition 
• U.S. ongoing for 15 years 
• Need for independent regulator 
• Visit by FCC Chairman, Secretary of Commerce, companies 
Recognize competition is necessary 
• Chinese want only domestic companies 
• Highly profitable sector 
• Law is taking a long time to work out 
• Fear of foreign companies entering only the most profitable sectors 
Universal service 
• MII Minister Wu bragged about building the line to Lhasa 
• Experiencing only 5% return 
• Who else would build that line? 
• Counter-argument: Create a universal service fund 
National security 
• Chinese want access to monitor conversations 




• Believes in monopoly in being more efficient in resource allocation 
• Monopoly builds his personal power base 
• Eliminated opponents 
• Ended CCF Unicom deals, will probably result of buyout of MetroMedia and Sprint 
stakes 
Breakup of China Telecom coming from Zhu Rongji 
CDMA 
• Situation unknown 
• Limited expansion? 
• China deliberately going in against U.S. standards, choosing European to offset U.S. 
power, as evidenced in barcoding, electrical voltage/frequency 
Chinese realize that competition is good 
• Evidenced in breakup of China Telecom 
• Anticipate spinoff companies will jump into other markets within 2 years 
Telecommunications liberalization will have a massive growth effect into other sectors 
• Cause for boom in the U.S. 
Chinese are eyeing the Korean chaebol model in bringing about economic reform 
Problem in reforms 
• Asian crisis 
• Power relationships within the government 
• Zhu had to backpedal 
U.S. companies losing patience 
• Ameritech, SBC, GTE 
• People closing up shop 
• Property values declining 
• Business more secure in Europe 
National security concerns 
• Codes to Iraqi missiles 
• Encrypted sabotage 
• GSM chose for appearance of security, although the system is very insecure 
Concerns with current Chinese telecommunications liberalization 
• Lack of national champion 
• National security 
• Development of remote areas 
• Ability to compete internationally 
• Development of expertise 
• Network security 
• Lack of management skills 
CCF 
• Sprint/Metro One 
• Chinese backed down from taking action against current deals due to foreign pressure 
Consumer interests 
• Note recent reduction in telephone installation charges 
• Reduced network access charges 
• Growing consumer movement, clamor for quality 
Domestic production desired 
• Semiconductor, telecommunications equipment 
• Chinese currently have no know-how in managing its network 
• Foreign companies apprehensive to give 
• Chinese do not want to pay 
• Chinese equipment contains advanced technology, but they do not know how to use it 
Pro-liberalization issues 
• Argument counter-intuitive 
• Telecommunications sector doing well, generating revenues second to tobacco tariffs 
• Chinese desire China Telecom to go abroad 
• MII officials dismiss pro-liberalization examples as not applicable 
• Decisions not necessarily rational 
Anti-liberalization issues 
• Universal service 
. Cream-skimming 
• Chinese concerned of being dependent, want national champions 
Economy slowing down 
• People getting disappointed 
. Status symbols change 
MII Minister Wu made a lot of enemies 
• Academics, think tanks 
• SDPC, SETC 
• Wu being forced to change 
March 4, 1999 
Robert Bernell 
Independent Consultant 
36D, Capital Paradise 
2324 Xiang Yuan Road 
Beijing 101300 
(T7F) 86-10-8046-3937 
rbernell @ iuol.cn.net 
Started in China with Asia-American Commodities 
• Partner with Metro Media 
• Sichuan/Chongqing/Ningbo GSM venture 
• Estimated $500 million investment 
• Required 25 joint ventures due to $30 million investment cap 
• Sought to lift investment ceiling 
• Unicom would not sponsor 
Xinde classified as a finance leasing company 
• Not subject to $30 million cap 
• Can do projects with only one JV 
• Lease of telecommunications equipment to Unicom 
• Currently operates 3 or 4 GSM networks 
• Positive responses from operator 
• Ventures are cash positive 
• Foreigners possess some degree of control 
• 2-3 committee members from investors, 2-3 members from Unicom 
• Roles of drafting budgets, implementing schedules, and participation on board 
• Control via approval of project work plan 
Unicom 
• Never concerned with ROI or maximizing ROI 
• Poor management, both technical and managerial 
Xinde lease allows 
• Greater flexibility in negotiations: $30 million cap, 30% registered capital by 
investors 
• Rest funded from debt financing, guaranteed by foreign investor 
• Xinde has no investment ceiling and no registered capital 
• Minimization of risk exposure 
• Long-term solution: members on the board and equity positions 
Who wins, and who loses with current structure? 
• Enormous benefits to China: employment, training, technology transfer, tax revenue 
• Unhappy investors: most willing to leave, sell out, making less than cost of capital 
Contrast with Hong Kong example 
• Entry of 4 mobile and 6 PCS operators 
• Fits Zhu Rongji's emphasis on infrastructure development 
• Hong Kong Telecom's mission statement: to provide higher EPS for stockholders 
(note focus on shareholder return) 
• Mindset not in China: Key managers are getting rich, not shareholders 
Lack of transparency 
• Attempts to audit Unicom deals, but never given appropriate information 
Philippines 
• Introduction of universal service obligations when foreigners entered 
Taiwan 
• Good engineering plan 
• Minimal waste of capital investment 
• Fear of redundant capital investment 
China Telecom open to FDI? 
• Why not have CT gain foreign expertise 
• CT listed in Hong Kong and New York to raise foreign capital 
• Telecommunications network operations currently poor 
• China wants to make the shift to PCS/VAS 
Challenges 
• CT has high volume customers 
• Next move into the countryside 
• Volume per line to decrease 
• CT crunched by universal service obligations 
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ME Minister Wu is losing his power base 
• CCF review 
• China Telecom breakup 
• Pressure for reform coming from State Council, SDPC, Ministry of Finance 
Influential research organizations 
• ETDRC 
• ME Information Center 
• China International Engineering Consulting Company 
Study announced 
• Looking into employment and economic growth aspects of telecommunications 
reform 
• SDPC presentation on national backbone development, service-oriented competition, 
and implications on infrastructure and overall economic development 
• Report to SDPC for the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) 
China wasting $6 billion/year from current tariff costs 
• Articles from ETDRC and Zhou Qiren 
No specific country is being benchmarked in introducing reforms 
• Chinese looking at Germany, Japan, and the U.S. 
• German model: high control, buildup of infrastructure from public sector 
• U.S. model: powerful private sector, economic justification for buildup 
MII feels current infrastructure is sufficient for the next 30 years 
• Key is to encourage efficient usage, not build-out 
• Value of foreign companies: make operations more efficient 
. Price will be the determining factor 
• Telecommunications services highly elastic 
Network is very advanced 
• Everyone connected to backbone with high-speed lines 
• People not necessarily demanding the service 
• Chinese desire newest technology 
Chinese hope that competition will cause a reduction of tariffs 
• Lower cost of services 
• Stimulate the economy 
• Faster deployment of technology 
• Push for domestic competition 
Breakup of China Telecom 
• Allow crossover within a couple years 
• creation of new operators 
• new entrants allowed to compete 
Sensitive telecommunications issues 
• High initial investment 
• National security: vulnerability to information war 
Chinese need expertise in developing and managing networks 
• Develop ability to employ the new technologies 
• Convergence in advanced networks, including IP telephony, video, and data 
